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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
One of the first obstacles that student pilots have to face is landing an
aircraft. Perfect landings are the ambition of every pilot and landings are
frequently used to evaluate pilot performance (Collins, 1981; King, 1998). Failure
to properly land the aircraft increases time to solo and may discourage students
from pursuing the private pilot certificate. Yet, it is specifically the landing
maneuver that most pilots struggle with (Matson, 1973). According to the
National Traffic Safety Board (NTSB), the landing maneuver is the leading cause
of all non-fatal aircraft accidents.
A special maneuver within the landing phase of operation is the flare. The
flare is the transition from a descent attitude to the landing attitude and is also
known as the f1areout, roundout, or leveloff (Jeppesen, 1985). Many pilots
intuitively acknowledge and struggle with the challenge of performing proper
flares. For example, Barnhart (as cited in Matson, 1973) notes that, "without
reservation, the roundout requires keener judgment and more practice than any
other single part of basic flying" (p. 4:337).
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2Nature of the Problem
A review of aircraft accidents draws attention to the flare phase of landing
operations. For instance, on February 10, 1996, a Mooney M20M flared too high.
The aircraft dropped 3.0m to 3.7m (10 to 12 ft), landed hard, departed the
runway, and struck a drainage ditch. Subsequently, the landing gear collapsed
and the left wing spar was damaged (National Transportation Safety Board
Identification: FTW96LA114). On May 13, 1996, a student pilot on a solo cross-
country stalled his Cessna 172 while attempting to land. The student pilot later
stated that he "... flared [too] early causing the plane to balloon up, and then the
aircraft stalled. The aircraft slammed to the ground before I could apply throttle."
The airplane was "approximately 5-10 feet above the runway... "when it stalled.
(National Transportation Safety Board Identification: IAD96LA084). On July 16,
1987, a student pilot was attempting his first solo flight in a Cessna 152. The
student failed to achieve a proper flare attitude on his second landing. The
aircraft touched down flat and fast, porpoised, and bounced three times.
Subsequently, the aircraft's nose gear collapsed, bringing the aircraft to a rest
(National Transportation Safety Board Identification: CHI87LA168).
Unfortunately, the former vignette is typical of numerous landing accidents.
Monthly aircraft landing accident synopses released by the National
Transportation Safety Board implicate a probable cause or contributing factor:
"Flare... Improper / Misjudged ...Pilot in command".
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According to the Airplane Flying Handbook (Federal Aviation
Administration, Revised 1999)
the roundout is a slow, smooth transition from a normal approach attitude
to a landing attitude. When the airplane, in a normal descent, approaches
within what appears to be about 10 to 20 feet above the ground, the
roundout or flare should be started, and once started should be a
continuous process until the airplane touches down on the ground
(p. 7-6).
Furthermore,
as the airplane reaches a height above the ground where a timely change
can be made into the proper landing attitude, back elevator pressure
should be gradually applied to slowly increase the pitch attitude and angle
of attack. This will cause the airplane's nose to gradually rise toward the
desired landing attitude. The angle of attack should be increased at a rate
that will allow the airplane to continue settling slowly as forward speed
decreases (Federal Aviation Administration, Revised 1999, p. 7-6).
Evidently, the flare is a crucial phase of the landing operation in which the aircraft
transitions from a controlled descent to actual contact with the landing surface
(Grosz, et aI., 1995). Less apparent are the factors fundamental to the execution
of a successful landing flare.
As indicated, the flare is initiated "within what appears to be about 3.0 to
6.1 m (10 to 20 ft.) above the ground." How should the pilot-in-command interpret
"what appears to be" a certain distance from the ground? Furthermore, what are
4the ways to assess vertical distance above the ground? Langewiesche (1972)
explains, "your first problem is to know when (in the glide) the time has come for
you to 'flare out', that is, stop the descent and make the airplane float level"
(pp. 297 - 298).
Bramson (1982) exposed the ambiguity of flare instructions by providing
flight manual examples of when to flare. One such example suggests, "at a
reasonable height, move the stick gently back and make the aircraft fly just
above the ground" (p. 44). Bramson remarks, "one man's 'reasonable' is another
man's 'outrageous' "(p. 44). Instructors may also provide ambiguous instructions.
Bramson (1982) notes that "many instructors like to say 'Round-out at the height
of a double decker' (which is all very well if you have ever been on the top deck
of a London bus - not everyone has) or 'Ease back on the elevators at 20 ft
above the ground', whereas experiments seem to indicate that experienced pilots
begin the transition from approach to hold-off rather higher than that" (p. 45).
Others recommend initiating the flare at "hangar height" (Kershner, 1998,
p. 13-5). Instructing students to flare at hangar height may be of little use since
not all hangars have standard heights and not all runways have hangars adjacent
to them. Yet another common recommendation is to use one-half of the aircraft
wingspan as a measure unit to initiate the flare (Christy, 1991). Once again,
attempting to judge vertical distance with the aid of a measurement scale that is
parallel to the ground may prove especially difficult.
Some flight instructors never really try to explain vertical distance
appreciation on approach to landing. When executing a misjudged approach,
5Bramson (1982) remembers comments such as" 'You're too bloody high!' or, in
Texas, 'Yo'all tryin' to kill me, lootenant?' But there was no real attempt to explain
why I was too high or, more important, how I was supposed to know" (p. 51).
Penglis (1994) adds,
your instructor compounds the humiliation by stating the obvious about
your landing ten feet high or ground plowing. They might come back with
something useless to cure it, like telling you that you were 'behind the
airplane,' which means you didn't think far enough ahead. That doesn't
deal with the problem of you not knowing where the ground begins (p. 91).
Furthermore,
after a frustrating lesson, you can sit with your instructor and try and
remember what you did during the lesson. You can't because you won't
remember, you won't think that is the problem. If your instructor only deals
with the standard teaching methods, he won't know why you don't know
where the ground is either. How can the instructor solve a problem that
neither of you understand? None of the standard stuff will work because it
does not identify and deal with the real problem... Because the reason no
student knows where the ground begins is because the method we use to
teach landing to students is wrong and does not work (Penglis, 1994,
p.91).
Finally, it seems that the flare maneuver poses a significant problem to
pilots since,
you have no idea where the air ends and the g:round begins. The closer
6you get to the ground, the less you are aware where it begins. You only
know where the ground was when you started the transition from the
approach to the landing. Anything beyond that is at best a guess, as you
try to round out the airplane based only on where you think the ground
might be. You cannot be ready for contact with the ground when you have
no idea when that will occur ... you think you have learned something but
are frustrated when you cannot repeat the performance. That is why it
takes so long to learn how to land an airplane (Penglis, 1994, p. 90).
Statement of The Problem
Many pilots and authors intui,tively recognize the flare as a difficult
maneuver. This study will explore whether improper flares are indeed a
significant issue, determine causes for improper flares, and evaluate flare training
methods. This task was undertaken using both qualitative and quantitative
methods.
Objectives of the Study
The primary objective was to determine whether improper flares are a
significant factor in general aviation. This goal was achieved through the analysis
of archival NTSB aircraft accident reports, as well as assessment of pilot
perceptions of the flare as a function of experience.
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The secondary objective was to determine probable causes for improper
flares. The extensive literature review of current flare training methods, and depth
perception cues, along with information yielded from the pilot perception
questionnaire, were instrumental in achieving this goal.
Finally, the tertiary objective was to assess the effectiveness and identify
weaknesses in current flare training methods.
Significance of the Study
I:mproper flares influence both financial and psychological well being.
Failure to correctly judge height during the flare contributes to increased
payloads on the main landing gear tires and struts at impact, which may
contribute to landing gear and structural damage. In addition, improper or
misjudged flares also increase brake, nosewheel tire, and nosewheel shimmy
dampener (on Cessnas) wear (Chrisy, 1991; Jorgensen, & Schley, 1990).
As mentioned earlier, perfect landings are the ambition of every pilot and
landings are frequently used to evaluate pilot performance (Collins, 1981; King,
1998). As a consequence, it is plausible that improper or misjudged flares may
affect pilot self-esteem and self-efficacy. Since student pilots are especially prone
to misjudge a landing flare, improper flares may directly contribute to increase
time to solo, training costs, and drop out rates. Referring to the landing phase of
operations, the Flight Training Handbook determines that "if the student shows
no progress at first, he may become discouraged and a severe mental handicap
-8
may develop" (as cited in Matson, 1973, p. 5).
Definition of Terms
Expert group was defined as Certified Flight Instructors (CFls) that are
actively involved in student training. CFI total pilot time exceeded 300 hrs at the
time of the study.
Flare was defined as the ability to judge height above the ground during
the leveloff for the purpose of this study.
Intermediate group was defined as instrument student pilots. Instrument
pilot total time exceeded 150 hrs but did not exceed 200 hrs at the time of the
study.
Novice group was defined as student pilots that are training for the private
pilot certificate. Student pilot total time exceeded 10 hrs but did not exceed 60
hrs at the time of the study.
Normal Conditions were defined as optimal Visual Flight Rules (VFR)
conditions (i.e., no wind, 10 miles visibility, etc.).
NTSB Accident Report.~ were defined as all accident reports produced by
the NTSB for the years 1995,1996, and 1997. These years were chosen
because they represented the most current accident report data at the time of the
study.
Part 141 schools were defined as flight schools that follow a standardized
Flight Aviation Regulation (FAR) method of training.
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Scope and Limitations
Perceptions were gathered from pilots undergoing intensive training or
instruction in Part 141 flight schools. The fact that all pilots were "current" or have
had recent flight experience may limit the ability to generalize findings to general
aviation pilots that are not frequent flyers. For example, Part 61 pilots are allowed
to complete flight training at their own pace, are not required to attend ground
school or flight labs, and typically interact with other pilots less frequently.
In addition, pilot perceptions were restricted to optimal conditions and
lighter general aviation (GA) aircrafts. Whereas, it is possible that proper
implementation of flares are hampered by conditions other than "normal", the
study was restricted to lighter GA aircraft since many of the heavier airline aircraft
utilize little or no flare landings (Collins, 1981).
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The purpose of this literature review is to describe (a) the flare
maneuver, (b) current flare instruction methods, (c) vision and depth perception,
and (d) vertical distance appreciation studies.
Definition and Significance
As shown in Figure 1, the leading cause of non-fatal aircraft accidents is
the landing phase of operations (National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB],
September 1998; NTSB, May 1999; NTSB, September 2000). According to
Balfour (1988), "only about 25% of accidents happen in mid-flight, and over 50%
on the approach or landing" (p. 697). Nagel (1988) concurs that more than half of
all airline accidents occur during the approach and landing phase of operations.
Nagel adds, "As interesting is the fact that the approach and landing accidents
are more reliably caused by human error than those of any other phase of flight
(nearly 75%)" (p. 278). Pilots are confronted by various tasks during all phases of
operations (see Wickens and Andre, 1999) but it is the landing phase that seems
to be the most crucial since "in other maneuvers, the pilot can continuously
10
11
correct his mistakes as they become apparent to him ... in the landing, the error
becomes apparent often only upon contact with the ground, at the instant when it
is too late for corrections" (Langewiesche, 1972, p. 287).
..,
Takeoff
Climb
Cruise
Maneuvering
Descent
Approach
Landing
Standing
Other
398
56
58
L.J19
328
99
279
104
52
u 12
263
60
.J 11
151
33
~20
2
=r.2117
o Total
DFatal
487
Figure 1. A breakdown of mean total and fatal accident-involved aircraft by first
phase of operation, 1995, 1996, and 1997 (adapted from National Transportation
Safety Board [NTSB], September 1998; NTSB, May 1999; NTSB, September
2000).
Of special concern is the landing flare phase. For instance, Bramson
(1982, p. 12) noted that there were 3,264 aircraft accidents during the flare and
touchdown phase of operations between 1975-1979. Interest in the flare
maneuver has waned since the 1970s. However, preliminary investigation of
aircraft accident reports suggests that a renewed interest in the maneuver is
appropriate.
Various authors have discussed the landing flare. According to Barnhart
(as cited in Matson, 1973), "early in their training many students can do
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everything but land the plane" (p. 39:36) and II without reservation, the roundout
requires keener judgment and more practice than any other single part of basic
flying" (p. 4:337). Love (1995) concurs, "one of the most difficult skills student
pilots need to master is determining the height of the aircraft during the flare"
(p. 61). Finally, Bramson (1982) states that, ''the one phase that can cause the
majority of student pilots to question why they took up flying (and make their
instructors wish they had stuck to golf) is the transition from approaching down
the gentle glide path to that brief flit over the runway, wheels just above the
ground, power off and airspeed decreased" (p. 44).
According to the Airplane Flying Handbook (Federal Aviation
Administration, Revised 1999),
the roundout is a slow, smooth transition from a normal approach attitude
to a landing attitude. When the airplane, in a normal descent, approaches
within what appears to be about 10 to 20 feet above the ground, the
roundout or flare should be started, and once started should be a
continuous process until the airplane touches down on the ground
(p. 7-6).
Furthermore,
as the airplane reaches a height above the ground where a timely change
can be made into the proper landing attitude, back elevator pressure
should be gradually applied to slowly increase the pitch attitude and angle
of attack. This will cause the airplane's nose to gradually rise toward the
desired landing attitude. The angle of attack should be increased at a rate
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that will allow the airplane to continue settling slowly as forward speed
decreases (p. 7-6).
Evidently, the flare is a crucial phase in which the aircraft transitions from a
descent attitude to actual contact with the landing surface. Less apparent are the
factors that contribute to successful landing flares.
Current Flare Instruction
As indicated, the flare is initiated "within what appears to be about 3.0 to
6.1 m (10 to 20 ft.) above the ground." How should the pilot-in-command interpret
"what appears to be" a certain distance from the ground? Furthermore, what are
the ways to assess vertical distance above the ground? Langewiesche (1972)
explains, "your first problem is to know when (in the glide) the time has come for
you to 'flare out', that is, stop the descent and make the airplane float level"
(pp. 297 - 298).
Bramson (1982) exposed the ambiguity of flare instructions by providing
flight manual examples of when to flare. One such example suggests, "at a
reasonable height, move the stick gently back and make the aircraft fly just
above the ground" (p. 44). Bramson remarks, "one man's 'reasonable' is another
man's 'outrageous' "(p. 44).
Instructors may also provide ambiguous instructions. Bramson (1982)
notes that "many instructors like to say 'Round-out at the height of a double
decker' (which is all very well if you have ever been on the top deck of a London
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bus - not everyone has) or 'Ease back on the elevators at 20 ft above the
ground', whereas experiments seem to indicate that experienced pilots begin the
transition from approach to hold-off rather higher than that" (p. 45). Other
instructors recommend to initiate the flare at "hangar height" (Kershner, 1998,
p. 13-5). Instructing a student to flare at hangar height may be of little use since
not all hangars have standard heights and not all runways have hangars adjacent
to them. Yet another common recommendation is to use one-half of the aircraft
wingspan as a measure unit to initiate the flare (Christy, 1991). Once again,
attempting to judge vertical distance with the aid of a measurement scale that is
parallel to the ground may prove especially difficult.
Some flight instructors never really try to explain vertical distance
appreciation on approach to landing. When executing a misjudged approach,
Bramson (1982) remembers comments such as II 'You're too bloody high!' or, in
Texas, 'Yo'all tryin' to kill me, lootenant?' But there was no real attempt to explain
why I was too high or, more important, how I was supposed to know" (p. 51).
Penglis (1994) adds,
your instructor compounds the humiliation by stating the obvious about
your landing ten feet high or ground plowing. They might come back with
something useless to cure it, like telling you that you were 'behind the
airplane,' which means you didn't think far enough ahead. That doesn't
deal with the problem of you not knowing where the ground begins (p. 91).
Furthermore,
after a frustrating lesson, you can sit with your instructor and try and
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remember what you did during the lesson. You can't because you won't
remember, you won't think that is the problem. If your instructor only deals
with the standard teaching methods, he won't know why you don't know
where the ground is either. How can the instructor solve a problem that
neither of you understand? None of the standard stuff will work because it
does not identify and deal with the real problem... Because the reason no
student knows where the ground begins is because the method we use to
teach landing to students is wrong and does not work (Penglis, 1994,.
p.91).
Finally, it seems that the flare maneuver poses a significant problem to
pilots since
you have no idea where the air ends and the ground begins. The closer
you get to the ground, the liess you are aware where it begins. You only
know where the ground was when you started the transition from the
approach to the landing. Anything beyond that is at best a guess, as you
try to round out the airplane based only on where you think the ground
might be. You cannot be ready for contact with the ground when you have
no idea when that will occur. .. you think you have learned something but
are frustrated when you cannot repeat the performance. That is why it
takes so long to learn how to land an airplane (Penglis, 1994, p. 90).
Common Errors
According to King (1999), the length oftime between the start of the flare
and the touchdown point is fundamental for a proper landing. Some of the most
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common errors in this fundamental length of time are (a) flaring too high, (b)
flaring too late, (c) bouncing, and (d) ballooning, (Kershner, 1998; King, 1999).
According to Gleim (1998), "a student tends to round out high during a
landing because (s)he is focusing on references that are too close or looking
directly down" (p. 305). Focusing too close leads to blurred perception and faulty
depth perception (also see Christy, 1991; Jeppesen, 1985; Kershner, 1998; King,
1999; Quinlan, 1999). The continuation of a high flare may result in a stall that
would lead to a hard landing (Federal Aviation Administration, Revised 1999).
Another common error is executing the flare too late. Pilots tend to flare
too late when they focus too far ahead (Christy, 1991; Jeppesen, 1985;
Kershner, 1981; Love, 1995). Kershner (1998) explains, "if you look too far
ahead, the error in your depth perception may cause you to fly the plane into the
ground" (p. 13-6). Attempting to correct for a late flare by applying rapid back
elevator pressure may impose heavy load factors on the wings and cause an
imminent stall. Such a correction and stall may "cause the airplane to lema
extremely hard on the main landing gear, and then bounce back into the air"
(Federal Aviation Administration, Revised 1999, p. 8-2). Kershner (1998) agrees
that flying the airplane into the ground may result in a bounce. In his words "the
plane hit the ground with quite a bit of flying speed left because the pilot hadn't
gotten the nose up to slow the plane down. The wheels hit and the rebound
forced the nose up suddenly, giving the wings added lift. The result was that
most of the height of the bounce was caused by this lift -- not by the bouncing
rubber tires ... " (p.13-14). Finally, Love (1995) and Butcher (1996) note that
--
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flaring too late may result in the nosewheel impacting the ground, or a
"wheelbarrow" landing.
Penglis (1994) suggests that standard flaring methods are the cause of
common errors during the flare
since the traditional round out or flare is dependent on precisely timing
your arrival at the landing attitude, so that it is just above the ground,
when you run out of lift, at the slowest possible speed, you can't possibly
do it if you cannot see the ground. That is why you flare too soon and end
up hanging in the air or too late and fly into the ground. If you ever time it
right, it is sheer luck (p. 90).
Vision and Depth Perception
Judging vertical distance above the ground during the flare is crucial to a
smooth and safe land ing (Love,. 1995). In reference to the process of estimating
height and movement, the Airplane Flying Handbook (Federal Aviation
Administration, Revised 1999) states, "during the approach, roundout, and
touchdown, vision is of prime importance" (p. 7-6). Thorn (1992) states, "vision is
the most important sense you have for landing" (p.13-13). Furthermore, "accurate
estimation of distance is, besides being a matter of practice, dependent upon
how clearly objects are seen" (Airplane Flying Handbook, Revised 1999, p. 7-6).
The reliance on vision seems to be overwhelming "despite the fact that our visual
sense is not completely reliable, pilots often tend to rely on it more than on their
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instruments; in many approach and landing accidents, primary flight display
equipment which would indicate the presence of guidance errors during the final
approach has been found to have been functioning normally" (Nagel, 1988,
p. 280) (also see Manon, 1996).
In reference to the visual and kinesthetic cues pilots use during the flare
and landing, Jeppesen (1985) notes that
descents and approaches to stalls have been practiced to build sensitivity
to control responses and smoothness in preparation for the flare and
landing. Generally, kinesthetic sensitivity is not developed fully at the time
landing practice begins; therefore, vision is the most important sense
(p. 4-17).
Green, Muir, James, Gradwell, & Green (1996) add, "probably the most critical
visual tasks that pilots are presented with are the judgments involved in landing.
These may be divided into three phases: initial judgment of an appropriate
(eg 3°) glide slope, maintenance of the glide slope during the approach, and
ground proximity judgments before touchdown" (p. 52).
Various authors have addressed the visual tasks that confront pilots during
landings. For example, Butcher (1996), Kershner (1998), and Love (1995)
remark that vision should not be fixed on one point during the approach and
touchdown. Nevertheless, continuous eye movement may be difficult since
"when you get tense, you will almost certainly stare; approaching the ground,
most students do get tense; that is largely why the landing is so difficult for most
beginners" (Langewiesche, 1972, p. 297). In reference to how far pilots should
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look during the approach, Christy (1991) recommends looking as far ahead as if
you were driving a car at the same speed. However, Kershner (1981) remarks
that if this recommendation is taken, pilots will flare too late since drivers tend to
look too far ahead and do not judge height (also see Grosz, et al. 1995).
In order to understand how pilots use vision to judge depth perception
during an approach for landing, a discussion of depth perception cues will follow.
Binocular Cues
Stereopsis. Binocular disparity (refer to Table 1) depends on both eyes
(see Goldstein, 1980). Our two eyes see two different visual fields because of the
distance between them. The overlap of the visual fields allows for three-
dimensional vision, which is synonymous with depth percept!ion. For every point
on the retina of one eye there is a corresponding point on the retina of the other
eye. Thus, if we were to place one retina on top of the other, the corresponding
retinal points would overlap. However, only images that pass through the
observer's point of fixation fallon corresponding points. The imaginary line that
passes through the point of fixation is called the horoptor. Images that are not
located on the horoptor fallon noncorresponding or disparate points. The
distance between the corresponding and disparate retinal points on each retina is
called the degree of disparity. The farther an object is from the horoptor, the
greater is the degree of disparity. Thus, disparity provides information about
depth of objects relative to our point of fixation.
Accommodation and convergence. Accommodation and convergence
depend on the muscles of the eyes rather than on information projected onto the
\
~
I
,...
--
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retina. Accommodation is the change in the shape of the lenses with change in
distance. The lenses of the eyes bulge (protrude) for close objects and flatten for
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTION OF BINOCULAR CUES
1. Accommodation. The lenses protrude for close and flatten for distant
objects.
2. Convergence. The eyes move inward for close and outward for distant
objects.
3. Stereopsis. This is the visual appreciation of three dimensions during
binocular vision, occurring during fusion of signals from slightly disparate
retinal points.
distant objects. The lenses bulge and flatten due to the action of the ligaments
that hold the lenses in place. Convergence is the way the eyes move inward to
look at a near point and outward to look at a distant point. It has been suggested
that accommodation and convergence may only provide depth information for
objects closer than about 3.0m (10 ft) from the observer (Goldstein, 1980).
Binocular vision: Innate or learned? Evidence suggests that depth
perception information is available even before the visual stimuli reaches the
cerebral cortex (Kalat, 1998). Specialized stereoscopic depth perception cells are
evident at the level of the retina and it is possible that cells in the magnocellular
pathway are sensitive to retinal disparity.
--
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Several reports have suggested that binocular vision is present at a very
early age (Fox, Aslin, Shea, & Dumais, 1980; Reinecke & Simons, 1974). In fact,
normal binocular vision may be present from 3 to 6 months of age (Reading,
1983). It remains unclear whether humans are born with the ability to detect
depth perception. Kalat (1998) stated that "the fine-tuning of binocular vision
must depend on experience" (p. 174). Nevertheless, it seems that humans
acquire the ability for stereoscopic vision very early in life.
Monocular Cues
Monocular cues (refer to Table 2) may produce depth information even
when using one eye. In other words, depth perception information may be
acquired in a two dimensional environment (Hawkins, 1993). A brief discussion of
monocular cues will ensue (see Bond, Bryan, Gigney, & Warren, March 1962;
Goldstein, 1980; Peter, 1999; Reinhart, 1993; Riordan, 1974).
Overlap (interposition). Closer objects overlap or cover more distant
objects.
Relative size. Larger objects seem to appear closer relative to smaller
objects.
Relative height. Objects that appear higher in the field of vision usually
appear to be more distant.
Atmospheric (aerial) perspective. When we look at an object we also look
at the air particles that are suspended between the object and us. These
particles make far objects look fuzzy and blue. The bluish tint is a result of the
short wave lengths that are between the viewer and the far away object. On the
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other hand, closer objects appear sharper since there are less air particles
between the object and the viewer.
TABLE 2
DESCRIPTION OF MONOCULAR CUES
1. Aerial perspective - distant objects appear more bluish and hazy than do
near objects.
2. Illumination perspective - light sources are assumed to be from above.
3. Interposition - closer objects obscure distant objects from vision.
4. Linear perspective - parallel lines seem to converge with distance.
5. Motion parallax - the relative motion of images across the retina. Nearer
objects appear to move faster than distant objects.
6. Relative height - objects that appear higher in the visual field appear more
distant than lower objects.
7. Relative size - larger objects seem to appear closer than distant objects.
8. Shadow - closer objects usually cast shorter shadows than distant objects.
9. Texture gradient - detail is lost with increasing distance.
Texture gradient. Farther objects seem to be closer together or appear to
be clustered. The level of detail decreases with distance. Evidence suggests that
texture gradient improves landing performance (Mulder, Pleijsant, vand der
Vaart, & van Wieringen, 2000), and provides slope information (Goldstein, 1980).
--
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Convergence of parallel lines.. Parallel lines seem to converge or meet as
distance increases.
Movement parallax. As you move, objects that are closer seem to move
relatively faster than objects that are farther away. The farther an object, the
more slowly it appears to move. In addition, while nearer objects appear to move
against the observer's motion, distant objects appear to move in the same
direction. Thus, movement parallax refers to the difference in the speed of
movement for far and near objects.
According to Kershner (1981) "there is a definite correlation between
apparent relative motion and judgment of height (or distance) if the size of the
reference is known ... the student will tend to level off too high because ... the
faster-than-normal movement of the runway tends to make him believe that he is
lower than he actually is, so he gets the nose up to the landing attitude too soon.
(crunch.)" (p. 84). Benson (1999) adds, "in addition to the visual cues that are
employed to perceive distance and its derivatives, the movement of objects in the
parafoveal and peripheral visual fields gives information about speed and
altitude, particularly during the final phase of the approach when the aircraft is
close to the ground" (p. 449).
Shadow. Closer objects usually cast shorter shadows than distant objects.
Other Monocular Cues
Horizon. The horizon is where the sky meets the earth. Whether on the
ground or in the air, the horizon appears to surround us at eye level. Thus,
objects that appear below the horizon are lower than you, those that appear
-
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above are higher, and those that appear at eye level are at your altitude. The
horizon also provides distance information. Objects farthest from the horizon are
perceived to be closer, while those nearer are perceived to be farther away
(Bond, Bryan, Rigney, Warren, March 1962; Riordan, 1974; Green, 1988). In
reference to the landing maneuver, one constant cue is the angle between the
horizon and the touchdown point. During a controlled descent for landing the
horizon and visual touchdown point will be placed at familiar locations on the
canopy (Benson, 1999).
According to Langewiesche (1972), experienced pilots are not concerned
with absolute estimates of height, depth, and distance. Contrarily, pilots are
interested in the angles formed between the horizon and objects below them in
terra firma. In Langewiesche's words, "it is angle, rather than actual height and
distance, that matters" (p. 271).
Familiar objects. Perspective of familiar objects (say, hangars, cars, or
other aircraft) also allow the pilot to assess vertical distance above the ground. If
familiar objects appear distorted (i.e., slanting upward or downward) you are
looking slightly up or down at them respectively. On the other hand, if familiar
objects do not seem distorted they are at eye level (Langewiesche,1972).
Associated with the perception of familiar objects is the concept of size
constancy. Size constancy refers to the fact that familiar objects that are far away
and have smaller visual angle and retinal image are not perceived to have
smaller absolute size. In other words, the size of a familiar object is perceived to
be constant regardless of its distance (Goldstein, 1980).
--
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Despite the ability to identify and define relevant monocular cues, it is not
clear which cues are most important for the landing phase of operations. For
example, Riordan (1974) surveyed 360 highly experienced (average total pilot
time was estimated to be 10,000 hrs) jet commercial airline pilots. The captains
and first officers were asked to "identify, In his own words, the visual cues or
'things' which are observed during a visual approach to landing made without the
aid of VASI (Visual Approach Slope Indicator) or during a nonprecision visual
approach" (p. 767). The questionnaires revealed that the three most important
monocular cues were (a) size and shape of the runway, (b) retinal image of
familiar objects, and (c) motion parallax. The relationship of the horizon to the
runway and motion perspective (also see Reinhardt-Rutland, 1997) were not
rated frequently. Nevertheless, other authors recognize other monocular cues as
most important. To mention a few, Tredici (1996) notes motion parallax and size
of retinal images, while Langewiesche (1972) recognizes the horizon and familiar
objects as cues that are used together to judge height.
In reference to identifying cues in order of importance, Green (1988)
advises that "it would require difficult experimentation to discover which of the
cues to horizon location any particular pilot uses, and it may fairly be suggested
that different pilots use different combinations of them" (p. 399) (also see Bond,
Bryan, Rigney, & Warren, March 1962). An analysis of pilot eye movement
during landing of a Piper Cub J-3 also failed to discover consistent visual habits
and suggested that instructors should not teach students to look at specific things
and not others during the landing (Tiffin and Bromer, 1943). Riordan (1973)
...
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concurs, "the perception of depth or distance during visual approach to landing is
a highly complex and integrative perceptual process involving continually
changing monocular visual cues" (p. 770).
Monocular vision: Innate or learned? Unlike binocular cues, which seem to
be present early in life, monocular cues requi.re "experience, even a person with
perfect vision must learn them--Iearn them formally or informally" (Langewiesche,
1972, p. 296). Benson (1999) concurs that "the perceptual processes are
complex and have to be learned by repeated experience in the flight
environment" (pp. 311 - 312). Finally, according to Tredici (1996), "the monocular
cues are learned, and some investigators believe that they can be improved by
study and training" (p. 539). It seems that the accurate interpretation of
monocular cues depends on visual experience or learning (Bramson, 1982; Love,
1995; Marieb,1995).
Binocular or Monocular?
Which cues do pilots use to estimate depth perception during the flare?
Since the qualitative difference between binocular and monocular cues is that of
nature vs. nurture, the question is fundamental to pilot training methods. Benson
(1999) maintains that, "at some stage in all landings, except those which are fully
automatic, the pilot has to make use of external visual cues to judge distance
from touch-down, altitude and derivatives of these variables. These visual cues
are essentially monocular cues" (pp. 448 - 449). Bond et a!. (March 1962)
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question the importance of binocular cues in aviation and state, "it is true that
there are many functions in flying an airplane which involve short distances, such
as reaching for controls within a cockpit, or observing the relative positions of
objects near the airplane on the ground. However, when one observes objects at
much greater distance than the wing span of his airplane he is probably more
dependent upon monocular cues" (p. 5-8).
Other authors have suggested that stereoscopic vision is only reliable for
short distances (Langewiesche, 1972; Reinhardt-Rutland, 1997; Reinhart, 1996)
whereas monocular cues "work over almost limitless ranges" (Green, 1988,
p. 395). For example, Reinhart, (1982) explains that "depth perception (having
both of your eyes working together to determine the distance of objects) is only
critical up to about 20 feet. Beyond that, depth perception is based on 'visual
cues'. That is, over the years that you have lived, your eyes and your brain have
become familiar with the relative sizes of different objects; for example, if you see
a distant tree with a car next to it, you know the approximate size of each and are
able to judge how far you are from them ... "(p. 67). Langewiesche (1972)
concludes that stereoscopic vision is only used in tasks that involve depth
perception for short distances such as formation flying and taxiing the airplane on
the ground. In reference to aerospace medical testing, Reinhart (1982) states
that testing for stereoscopic vision is "not as critical as one would expect, unless
there is marked inability to 'fuse' the eyes for vision less than 20 feet" (p. 68).
Various other authors provide evidence to contradict the "old superstition"
(Langewiesche, 1972, p. 296) that binocular vision is fundamental for pilots.
-
-
....
28
Wiley Post is often mentioned in reference to the ability of one-eyed pilots to
judge a landing just as well as pilots with normal vision (Hawkins, 1993;
Langewiesche, 1972). Nagel (1988) provides evidence from unmanned aircraft
operations. He explains that "a number of demonstrations over the past several
decades have shown that an aircraft can be flown safely using a closed-circuit
television camera to replace the natural visual cues seen through the
windscreen" (p. 281).
Finally, evidence for the functional differences between binocular and
monocular vision stem from animal research. Unlike humans, who have
stereoscopic vision, some animals have panoramic vision. Panoramic vision is
possible in animals with laterally placed eyes. In such animals, the location of the
eyes minimizes the overlap of the two visual fields. Since convergence is
minimized, animals with panoramic vision have a greater visual field, but lack or
have limited stereoscopic vision (Marieb, 1995). However, studies have
suggested that birds such as pigeons have pathways that are specialized for
stereoscopic (binocular) and panoramic (monocular) vision (GOntOrkOn, Miceli, &
Watanabe, 1993). In such birds, binocular vision is controlled by the frontal
pathways, and monocular vision by the lateral pathways. It has been suggested
that behaviors such as detection of enemies and foraging, which require depth
perception for distant objects, are performed by the lateral visual pathways. On
the other hand, behaviors such as pecking, which require depth perception for
close objects are performed by the frontal visual pathways. Similarly, eagles and
falcons also alternate between the two pathways. They utilize lateral (monocular)
3:
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vision to fixate on distant objects and switch to binocular vision when
approaching their prey. Thus, monocular cues are used to assess depth
perception for distant objects and binocular cues for close objects.
Reliance on binocular cues may actually discourage pilots from acquiring
the necessary skills for depth perception during the flare. For example,
Liebermann and Goodman (19911 ) examined the effects of visual information on
the ability to reduce impacts at touchdown. To generate landing impacts, a
horizontal free-fall device with a self-releasing mechanism was used. Participants
were randomly assigned to vision and no-vision conditions. Participants in the no
vision condition were allowed to see the height from which they would release
themselves, as well as the landing surface prior to the free-fall. Liebermann and
Goodman discovered that vision during flight did not aid participants in producing
softer landings at touchdown. In fact, under certain conditions, higher impacts
were registered when vision was available. Thus, Leibermann and Goodman
concluded that cognitive iinterpretations might have had an advantage over
continuous visual guidance. In their words, "vision did not seem to help in
reducing the impacts with the ground ... dependence on visual information may
interfere with the adoption of a more appropriate landing strategy. Subjects in
vision trials rely only on this continuous source of information, while blindfolded
individuals adopted a specific strategy, and prepared in advance instead"
(p.1404).
....
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The Proper Flares - Experience Paradox
Since depth perception at landing and touchdown depend on monocular
cues, pilots must learn to interpret those cues. The learning process of
interpreting perceptual cues is influenced by experience (Hawkins,1993). For
example, "stepping onto a moving walkway or an escalator when it is stationary
gives a strange sensation. A conflict has arisen between the visual message,
which says it is stationary, and past experience which says it should be
moving ..." (p. 114).
Langewiesche (1972) emphasized that all pilots learn to interpret and use
monocular clues in order to assess depth perception. Furthermore, "the
experienced pilot will say, 'I never use any of that stuff ... but the fact is that
even the experienced pilot does use these clues and probably no others. He just
calls it sense. Any landing field, even the loneliest, most desolate, has an
abundance of clues of the kind described" (p. 299).
Support to the notion that depth perception improves with experience
comes from a study that assessed the ability of pilots and non-pilots to estimate
low-level altitudes from photographs (Rinalducci, Patterson, Forren, & Andes,
1985). Participants were presented with photographs taken at different altitudes
and asked to estimate the altitude based on visual cues such as object density,
terrain features of known size, terrain features with vertical development, and
shading. Results indicated that pilots were more accurate in altitude estimation
than non-pilots, suggesting that experience is a necessary ingredient in
-
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interpreting low-level flight depth perception cues (on the ability to extract depth
perception information from a two dimensional highway-in-the-sky display, see
Williams, 2000).
If one accepts the premise that depth perception during the flare depends
on monocular cues, and that the interpretation of monocular cues depends on
experience, then a paradox emerges. Those that are prone to commit improper
flares, such as student pilots, have the least experience. Matters are further
complicated since a 5000 hrs total time pilot only has about 8 hrs of flare time
(King, 1998). According to Langewiesche (1972), "the more experienced pilot,
too, frequently misjudges his height slightly ..." (p. 291). Kershner (as cited in
Matson, 1973) adds, "this disease of sweating landings even strikes old pilots
who should know better" (34:82).
Flare and Depth Perception Instructions
Simulating the landing attitude while the airplane is safely parked on the
ground is one exercise for improving vertical distance appreciation (Bramson,
1982; Kershner, 1981). Achieving the proper level of attack may be attained by
placing a box under the nose wheel of a grounded aircraft (as suggested by
Bramson), or by pushing down on the tail (as suggested by Kershner). Bramson
recommends spending at least 30 min absorbing the visual cues as they appear
from the cockpit at the landing attitude. The exercise may also help pilots to
practice shifting their gaze down the left side of the aircraft as the level of attack
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increases and anterior view is blocked. Kershner recommends that flight
instructors walk to the left of the aircraft nose and show the student pilot the
appropriate visual field for scanning. This exercise is imaginative but may be
more suitable for the roundout phase, as back elevator pressure is gradually
increased, compared to the leveloff phase when pilots judge their height above
the ground.
Another exercise suggested is flying the aircraft low and slow down the
runway at hold off altitude (Bramson, 1982; Kershner, 1981). Bramson maintains
that holding the aircraft just above the runway teaches vertical distance
appreciation as well as proper scanning techniques. Matson (1973) examined the
effectiveness of a prolonged flare as a teaching tool,. He investigated the effects
of prolonged flares on (a) attempts to land, (b) time-to-Iand, and (c) time to solo
across instructional environments (i.e., aircraft type, instructors, sequence of
maneuvers). No significant differences were found among the students taught by
the prolonged flare and those taught by the normal flare methods.
In reference to the role of vision during the flare, Penglis (1994) identified an
optical illusion. During a normal approach the aircraft appears to be descending
towards the ground. However, as the aircraft transitions for landing, the ground
appears to rise toward the aircraft. That is when, according to Penglis, the flare
begins. Penglis adds that
all the coaching in the world won't stop the mistake that every student
makes. You fly the airplane down near where you think the ground is,
raise the nose to where it totally obscures any forward vision, idle the
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engine, release all control pressures which neutralize your flight controls,
stare straight ahead at the blue sky over the nose, wait, pray, and hope for
the best. All students give up flying the airplane the minute the ground
disappears from view. From then on the landing is just a guess (p. 91).
Penglis recommends placing the nose of the aircraft just under the end of
the runway during the transition for landing. When the nose is at a level attitude
with the far end of the runway the flare should be initiated. In order to keep the
end of the runway just under the nose the pHot must increase back-elevator
pressure. That necessity will protect against improper flares. For example, pilots
that tend to flare too high will be forced to continue their descent until they are
able to place the nose just under the runway end. Conversely, pilots that flare too
late will be required to initiate the flare earlier in order to achieve the desired
visual reference.
Interim Discussion
The transition from a descent attitude to leveloff flight marks the
beginning of the flare. During this transition. vision is of prime importance.
Nevertheless, there is no agreement among training methods how to use vision
during the landing flare, and no one method is more effective than another (also
see Matson, 1973). Generally, flare instructions and flight training manuals,
which have not changed since the 1930s (see Matson, 1973), fail to explain how
to judge what "appears to be" 10 - 20 ft from the ground, and regard the ability as
'.i~
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natural.
It is reasonable to assume that pilots learn appropriate depth perception
cues through experience even though the process may not be conscious.
Dependence on experience represents a significant problem, since, on average.
the flare only lasts 6 sec (King, 1998) and general aviation pilots in general, and
students in particular, lack experience.
In conclusion, a review of the literature suggests that the flare maneuver
may represent a problem in genera~ aviation. Assessing the frequency of flare
accidents and pilot perception of the flare as a function of experience are the first
steps to understanding the magnitude and significance of this problem.
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III DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Study 1 - National Traffic Safety Board Accident Reports
In order to determine the magnitude and significance of improper flares,
accident reports produced by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
were analyzed. The NTSB is an independent federal agency that investigates
every civil aviation accident in the United States. The accident database
compiled by the NTSB is open to the public and contains information about civil
aviation accidents within the United States, its territories and possessions, and in
international waters. For the purpose of this study, only the final description of
accidents and probable cause were used. Since the lag time between preliminary
to final reports is approximately three years, this study analyzed accident reports
from 1995, 1996, and 1997. Each narrative was read and analyzed. An accident
report was labeled as a flare accident if the NTSB determined the probable
cause to be a flare accident, or if there were explicit clues within the narrative
that implicated a flare accident. Overall, 6676 accident reports were analyzed.
Study 2 - Pilot Perception Questionnaire
In order to determine the factors that contribute to improper flares this
35
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study employed a questionnaire. The questionnaire was constructed for the
purpose of the study and assessed pilot perceptions of the flare as a function of
experience.
Participants
In order to assess pilot perceptions of the flare as a function of experience,
three groups of pilots (novice, intermediate, expert) were surveyed using
purposive sampling.
An a priori power analysis was conducted with the statistical software
Gpower. Results suggested a total sample size of at least 159 pilots (minimum of
53 novice, 53 intermediate, and 53 expert; alpha = .05, power = .80, effect size
Uf' = 0.25). However, due to insufficient response rates, only 134 pilots
(novice = 55, intermediate = 45, expert = 34) participated in the survey design.
Appendix A provides descriptive information by school and experience.
The novice group included student pilots (n = 55; mean age = 20.45,
so = 3.31; mean total flight time = 27.68 hrs, SO = 16.26). Only student pilots
that were training for the private pilot certificate were considered as participants.
Student pilot total time exceeded 10 hrs, but did not exceed 60 hrs at the time of
the study. The intermediate experience group included instrument student pilots
(n = 45; mean age = 22.27, SO =4.46; mean total flight time = 183.02 hrs,
SO =39.49). Only pilots that were training for the instrument-rating certificate
were considered as participants. Instrument pilot total time exceeded 150 hrs but
was not more than 200 hrs at the time of the study. Finally, the expert group
consisted of Certified Flight Instructors (CFls) that were actively involved in
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student training (n = 34; mean age = 25,85, SO = 5.21; mean total flight time =
785,53 hrs, SO = 750,59). Certified flight instructors total pilot time exceeded 300
hrs at the time of the study,
Pilots were drawn from three Part 141 approved flight schools, The
schools were (a) the department of aviation and space program at Oklahoma
State University located in Stillwater, OK, (b) Spartan School of Aeronautics
located in Tulsa, OK, and (c) the department of aviation at the University of
Oklahoma located in Norman, OK.
Oklahoma State University (OSU) is a large (approximately 19,553
students, Oklahoma State University, 2000) comprehensive research university.
Students participating in the bachelor degree in aviation sciences with
specialization in the professional pilot program were recruited. The department of
aviation and space program operates from Stillwater Municipal Airport (SWO)
located in Stillwater. Spartan is a private aeronautical college, The college offers
diploma, as well as associate degree programs in aviation maintenance, aviation
flight, aviation electronics, instruments, communications, quality control and
nondestructive testing, Students participating in the professional pilot diploma
program, as well as the professional pilot degree program were recruited,
Spartan School of Aeronautics operates from Richard Lloyd Jones Airport (RVS)
in Tulsa. Finally, the University of Oklahoma (OU) is a large (approximately
23,153 students, University of Oklahoma, 2000) comprehensive research
university. Students specializing in the professional pilot or aviation management
program that leads to an undergraduate degree in aviation were recruited. The
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department of aviation operates from Max Westheimer Airpark (OUN) in Norman,
OK.
Participation in the study was voluntary. Participants were notified that
their participation was voluntary, and that they were permitted to refuse to
participate or withdraw from participating at any time. Demographic information
included (a) gender, (b) age, (c) total flight time, (d) approximate flight hours
within 90 days, and (e) type of aircraft most frequently flown. Participants were
debriefed upon completion of the study.
Research Instrument
As evident from Appendix B, pilot perceptions were assessed using a
23-item questionnaire. The first part consisted of 10 standard flight maneuvers.
Pilots were asked to assess how difficult they believe each maneuver is to
execute properly based on their experience. In reality, the landing flare was the
only item of interest. The other nine items were presented to increase the
sensitivity of the measuring scale.
The remaining items were specific to the landing flare. Items 11 - 13 were
designed to assess perceptions of landing flare accident frequencies. Answers
were compared to accident statistics derived from this study. That comparison
provided an index to the perceived significance of the flare maneuver. Pilots were
asked to assess the frequency of landing flare accidents, how confident they
were in their assessment of landing flare accident frequencies, and the
probability of being involved in a flare accident during the landing phase of
operations. Convergent validity was assessed through items 11 and 13.
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Items 14 - 20 assessed the factors that contribute to successful landing
flares, perceived difficulty of the flare, and perceived need for improved training
methods. Pilots were asked if they were confident that they were at flare altitude
before initiating the flare, what factors assisted them to estimate height in the
past, whether they perceived the task of judging height difficult, how they knew it
was time to flare, was there a need for improved flare training methods, to what
they attributed their current successful landing flares, and if they perceived the
ability to judge height during the flare as innate or learned. Partial convergent
validity was provided through items 15 and 19.
Whereas items 1 - 20 were forced choice questions (Likert scale or
multiple choice), the remaining three (21 - 23) were open-ended. Items 21 - 22
were designed to allow pilots to elaborate on answers made previously. Pilots
were reminded of items 17 and 19 and asked to expl'ain how they knew it was
time to initiate the flare, and to what they attributed their current successful flares.
Finally, item 23 attempted to identify the visual cues necessary for depth
perception during the flare.
Questionnaire design and development. The questionnaire was developed
with the assistance of novice, intermediate, and expert pilots.
Content validity. Experts in the field of aviation and psychology were
asked to evaluate whether each item assessed what it purported to assess.
Experts rated each item on a 10 point scale (1 =low content validity, 10 =high
content validity). Only items with mean rating of 8 or higher were included in the
questionnaire.
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Research Design and Procedure
Flight schools were visited pending (a) prior arrangement with flight
school officials, (b) approval of Internal Review Board, and (c) approval of
individual flight center review board (if any).
Pilots were contacted while in ground school or flight center settings.
The investigator explained (a) his affiliation, (b) the purpose of the study, and
(c) participant rights. Participants were then allowed to complete the
questionnaire at their own pace. Upon completion, pilots were debriefed,
Questionnaire data was scrutinized using a between-subjects one-way
ANOVA (novice, intermediate, expert). A total sample size of 134 pilots
(novice=55, intermediate=45, expert=34) responded to the questionnaire. All
assumptions underlying the use of a one-factor linear ANOVA model
(independence, normality, homogeneity of variance) were verified.
Analysis of data. The first step was to test for possible effects of flight schools
on pilot perceptions. Homogeneous experience groups were compared across
school environments to test for main effect of school. Next, depending on the
results, each item was analyzed for effects of experience on pilot perceptions.
One-factor ANOVA was used to test the effects of experience on perceptions for
items that did not show a significant main effect of school environment.
Conversely, treatment by block design was used to test effects of experience on
perceptions for items that did show a significant main effect of school
environment. Tukey Honestly Significant Different (HSD) tests were used to
explore significant main effects. All comparisons were conducted at the .05 level
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of significance.
Dependent variable. Pilot perceptions of the flare. operationally defined by
individual item scores.
Independent variable. Pilot experience (novice, intermediate, expert).
Hypotheses
Ho. There will be no significant difference in mean perceptions among the novice,
intermediate, and expert groups.
H1. There will be a significant difference in mean perceptions among the novice,
intermediate, and expert groups.
Exploratory F test. Three separate sets of exploratory tests were
conducted for each item to determine main effect of learning environment (OU,
OSU, Spartan). One set examined the effects of school environment on novice
pilot perceptions, another the effects of school environment on intermediate pilot
perceptions, and the last, the effects of school environment on expert pilot
perceptions. Significant differences in mean pilot perceptions may have
suggested the existence of confounding variables such as quality of instruction or
type of aircraft used.
It was hypothesized that there would be no significant differences in
mean perception among the three training locations for each homogeneous
experience group, ~osu= ~ou = ~s·
Rationale. Review of the literature suggested that pilot perceptions of the
flare depend on experience or learning. Level of experience was a factor in the
design, and thus was measured. Furthermore, all training locations followed
"
.:.
.:
-standardized Part 141 Federal Aviation Rules, thus controlling for quality of
training. It was determined that items with a significant main effect of school
environment will be blocked with a treatment by block design.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
General
This thesis employed quantitative and qualitative measures. The results
for each are presented next.
National Traffic Safety Board Accident Reports
Overall, 6676 accident reports produced by the National Traffic Safety
Board (NTSB) were analyzed for frequency of flare accidents. Since the
frequency of flare accidents is subsumed within the approach and landing
category, results presented in this section are unique to this study. Appendix C
provides frequency of flare accidents by year and aircraft type, It was discovered
that the National Traffic Safety Board (NTSB) investigated an average of 7.44
(SO =3.91) flare accidents per month across the years 1995 (M =6.50,
SO =3.32),1996 (M =9.08, SO =4.48), and 1997 (M =6.75, SO =3.62). Given
outliers, it would be prudent to consider that the mode and median of flare
accidents across the three years was eight. There was no significant difference in
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mean flare accidents among the three years, E=(2, 33) =1.654 > .05.
As shown in Figure 2, the frequencies of flare accidents increased during
the warmer months. That trend can be found across phases of operation. The
reason may be simple, since more aircraft are flown during the warmer months
the probability of accidents increases.
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Figure 2. Flare Accident Frequencies by Month
Flare accident frequencies by aircraft type and year are presented in
Figure 3. Overall, across the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, 83.96% of all aircraft
involved in flare accidents were single engine aircraft. Helicopter flare accident
frequencies constituted 7.09% of all flare accidents, multi-engine 5.97%, Jet
engine 1.49%, glider 1.12%, and gyroplane 0.37%. Similar frequencies are
reflected in accident by aircraft type data for total aircraft accidents published by
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the National Transportation Safety Board.
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Figure 3. Flare Accident Frequencies by Aircraft Type and Year
Pilot Perception Questionnaire
Content Validity
A 23-item questionnaire was constructed for the purpose of this study.
Experts in the fields of psychology and aviation were asked to rate the items for
content validity. Only items with a mean content validity of 8 and above were
included in the questionnaire. Mean expert rating for items 1 - 10,12,13, and
15 - 23 was 10. Item 11 received a mean rating of 9.5. A mean rating of 8.5 was
awarded to item 14.
"
--
46
Assumption of ANOVA
The questionnaire design used unequal sample sizes. It is important to
stress that the unequal sample sizes were unrelated to the dependent variable.
In other words, failure to achieve equal sample sizes was not due to a systematic
manipulation. Therefore, it was decided to use an unweighted mean design.
The likelihood of violating the assumptions of normality and homogeneity
increase in unequal sample size designs (Keppel, 1991). Even mild deviations
from the assumptions of normality and homogeneity require careful interpretation
of the results. The assumptions of ANOVA, deviations from the assumptions, and
corrections to violations of the assumptions are presented next.
Independence. In order to ensure independence of scores, pilots were
advised not to converse while completing the questionnaire and encouraged to
work individually. Furthermore, pilots were notified that there are no right or
wrong answers since the questionnaire measures individual opinions or beliefs.
Normality. ANOVA is robust to violations of normality when cells include
less than twelve cases. Assumptions of normality were met when effects of
experience on pilot perceptions were measured.
However, when the effect of school environment on piiot perceptions
was measured, assumptions of normality were not met for the expert group. Two
expert cells contained less than 12 subj:ects (OSU = 11, Spartan=11). As
suggested by Keppel (1991), the significance level for the expert
group was shifted from .05 to .025 in order to correct for the asymmetric
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distribution. Thus, effects of school environment on expert pilot perceptions was
conducted at the .025 alpha level.
Homogeneity of Variance. Results suggested that group variances were
significantly different for two items. Group variances were significantly different
for contribution of instrument reading on the ability to estimate aircraft height in
the past, Fmax (2, 131) = 1.72, Q < .05, and contribution of CFI instruction to the
success of current landing flares, Fmax (2,131) = 2.97 Q < .05.
Since the Fmax ratio did not exceed three (Kepple, 1991), a more
stringent alpha level (.01) was adopted for the items mentioned above in order to
correct for type I error.
Exploratory F Test
As mentioned, the effects of school environment on pilot perception were
measured before testing for effects of experience on pilot perceptions. Three sets
of exploratory tests were conducted for each item. One set measured the effects
of school on novice pilot perceptions, another the effects of school on
intermediate pilot perceptions, and the last, the effects of school on expert pilot
perceptions. Whereas a one-way ANOVA design was used to analyze effects of
experience on pilot perceptions for items that did not show a main effect of
school environment, a treatment by block design was used to analyze items that
did show a main effect of school. Thus, school was co-varied for items that
showed a main effect of school. Items that were robust to the effects of school
:~
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environment are listed next.
An exploratory main effect analysis of variance revealed a significant
effect of school environment (OU, OSU, Spartan) on pilot perceptions for
estimated number of flare accidents per year, contribution of innate abilities to
depth perception during the flare, and improved training methods.
Significant effects of school on novice pilot perceptions regarding flare
accident frequencies were found, E (2,.52) =8.100, Q =.001. Post hoc analysis
revealed that Spartan novice pilots (M =303.54, SD =137.43) estimated higher
accident frequencies than Oklahoma State University (M = 208.00, SD ::: 128.02)
or University of Oklahoma (M = 130.15, SD = 100.08) novice pilots.
In addition, significant effects of school on intermediate pilot perceptions
regarding the contribution of innate abilitiles to judgment of height during the flare
were found, E (2,45) =3.351,12 =.045. However, these differences in
perceptions among Oklahoma State University (M ::: 3.83, SD ::: 1.42),
University of Oklahoma (M ::: 3.78, SD ::: 1.25), and Spartan (M = 2.77,
.sD = .832) intermediate pilots were subsumed within a non-significant Tukey's
Honestly Significant Difference post hoc analysis. Nevertheless, school was
blocked when the effects of experience on pilot perceptions for the above-
mentioned item were analyzed.
Finally, significant effects of school on intermediate pilot perceptions
regarding the need for improved flare training methods were found, E (2, 42) =
3.355, Q = .044. Post hoc analysis suggested that Oklahoma State University
intermediate pilots (M =4.39, SD =1.50) were more likely to believe that there is
!~
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a need for improved flare training methods than Spartan intermediate pilots
(M = 3.23, SO = 1.24).
Findings
Effects of experience on pilot perceptions for each item, as well as
omnibus findings are presented next.
Perceived difficulty. As shown in Figure 4, significant effects of standard
fli.ght maneuvers on pilot perceptions of difficulty were found, E (9, 1330) =
32.469, Q =.001 (effect size "eta 211 =.180, power =1.00). Post hoc analysis
revealed that pilots believed the flare maneuver (M =3.07, SO =1.42) to be more
difficult than steep turns (M =2.61, SO =1.18), takeoff roll (M =1.42, SO =.778),
holding altitude (M =2.18, SO =1.13), climbing (M =1.57, SO =.862),
descending (M =1.62, SO =.940), taxiing (M =1.42, SO =.843), coordinated
turns (M = 2.04, SO = 1.07), forward slip (M = 2.31, SO = 1.26), and landing roll
(M = 2.06, SO = 1.35).
Furthermore, significant effects of experience on perceived difficulty of the
flare maneuver were found, E (2, 131) = 6.875, P = .001 (effect size "eta211 = .095,
power =.917). Post hoc analysis indicated that novice pilots (M =3.58,
SO = 1.41) believed the flare maneuver to be more difficult than intermediate
(M =2.84, SO =1.15) or expert (M =2.56, SO =1.54) pilots. Intermediate and
expert pilot perceptions did not differ.
When isolated from other maneuvers, there was no effect of experience
on the perceived difficulty of judging the aircraft height during the flare,
'i
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E (2, 131) = .911, Q> .05. Marginal means for perceived difficulty were (M = 3.32,
SD =1.41). Moreover, confidence in estimating the aircraft altitude during the
flare was not effected by experience, E (2, 131) =1.960, Q> .05. Overall, pilots
were confident in their ability to estimate the aircraft altitude during the flare
(M = 5.57, SD = 1.13).
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Figure 4. Task Difficulty by Maneuver and Pilot Experience
Perceived significance of the flare maneuver. Experience did not influence
pilot estimation of flare accident frequencies, E (2, 125) = 2.773, Q> .05. Overall,
regardless of experience, pilots estimated that there were 199.39 (SO =135.81)
flare accidents per year. Pilot assessments were compared with flare accident
frequencies for 1995, 1996, and 1997. The mean number of flare accidents
across the three years was 89.33 (SD =17.09). Thus, pilots estimated flare
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accident frequencies to be twice as frequent as they really are.
Pilots were not equally likely to be confident in their answers,
E (2, 131) = 6.487, Q =.002 (effect size "eta2.. = .090, power = .901). Post hoc
analysis revealed that expert pilots (M = 3.94, SO = 1.23) were more confident
than intermediate (M = 3.18, SO = 1.21) or novice pilots (M = 2.96, SO = 1.23).
Overall, regardless of experience, there was no significant relationship among
the number of flare accidents reported, and level of confidence, r (134) = .091,
Q> .05.
When asked for the likelihood of being involved in a flare accident during
the landing phase of operations, most pilots (novice=27.3%, intermediate=26.7%,
expert=38.2%) answered 0 - 5%. The proportion of flare accidents within total
landing accidents was computed for 1995 (19.90%), 1996 (27.59%), and 1997
(19.90%). It was found that flare accidents accounted for 22.44% of the total
landing accidents. Thus, while pilots overestimated flare accident frequencies,
they underestimated the significance of flare accidents in proportion to overall
landing accidents. Nevertheless, it is possi!ble that pilots misunderstood the
question and estimated the likelihood of personally being involved in a flare
accident.
Components of successful flares. As shown in Figure 5, factors that may
have assisted pilots in estimating their height during their first solo flare attempts
had a significant effect on pilot perceptions. E (4, 665) = 159.818, P = .001
(effect size "eta 211 = 0490, power =1.000). Post hoc analysis revealed that
practice (M.-= 6.43, SO = .984) assisted pi!lots more than CFI instructions
--
h
"
' ..
'.,
52
(M.-= 5.33, SO = 1.54), instrument readings (M.-= 3.20, SO = 1.75), pilot manual
(M.-= 2.43, SO = 1.47), and ground school (M.-= 3.34, SD = 1.75). Pilots believed
that, with the exception of practice, CFI instructions help them more than
instrument reading, pilot manual, and ground school in their first solo attempts,
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Figure 5. Contributing Factors to Successful Flares During Initial Solo Attempts
Pilots attributed the success of past landing flares to practice, CFI
instruction, contribution of ground school, instrument reading, or pilot manual
regardless of experience, E (2, 131) =.858, Q> .05. Overall, marginal means
suggested that pilots did not believe that ground school training (M =3.34,
SD =1.75), instrument reading (M =3.20, SO =1.75), and pilot manual
(M =2.43, SO = 1.47) assisted them in estimating the aircraft height before
initiating the flare during their first solo attempts.
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As depicted in Figure 6, similar findings were noted among factors that
contributed to current successful landing flares, E (4, 665) = 301.606, Q = .001
(effect size "eta2" =.645, power =1.000). Post hoc analysis revealed that pilots
attributed their current successful flares to pattern practice (M =6.32, SO =1.10)
rather than their instructor (M = 5.70, SO = 1.33), natural ability (M = 4.63,
SD = 1.43), aviation books (M = 2.75, SO = 1.35), or sheer luck (M = 1.78,
SD = 1.18). Pilots believed that their instructor helped them more than natural
ability, aviation books or sheer luck, and attributed their successful landing flares
to natural ability rather than aviation books or sheer luck.
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Figure 6. Contributing Factors to Current Successful Landing Flares
Pilot experience did not have an effect on pilot perceptions regarding the
significance of pattern practice, E (2, 131) =.628,Q > .05. Overall mean
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significance of pattern practice was (M =6.32, SO =1.10). Nevertheless,
experience did have an effect on pilot perceptions regarding the contribution of
CFI instruction to current successful landing flares, E (2, 131) =8.442, Q =.001
(effect size "eta2" = .114, power = .962). As suggested by post hoc analysis,
novice pilots (M =6.24, SO =1.30) contributed their successful landing flares to
their CFI more than intermediate (M =5.31, SO =1.38) or expert (M =5.35,
SO = 1.38) pilots. On the other hand, intermediate and expert pilots did not differ.
Attributing successful current flares to natural ability was not affected
by pilot experience. E (2, 131) =.627, Q> .05. Overall descriptive statistics
revealed that 66.14% of current successful flares were attributed to natural ability
(M =4.63, SO =1.43). Similarly, experi1ence did not have an effect on pilot
perceptions when they were asked "is the ability to estimate height innate or
learned?" E (2, 125) =1.672,12 > .05. However, in this case, only 46.00%
answered that the ability is innate (M = 3.22, SO =1.48).
Finally, experience did not have an effect on pilot perceptions regarding
the need for improved training methods (M =3.63, SO =1.54), E (2, 125) =.510,
p> .05.
Monocular cues. Overall 85.11 % of all pilots (novice =76.4%, intermediate
=84.4%, expert =100%) stressed the importance of vision during the leveloff. As
shown in Figure 8, when asked what type of visual information would assist in
estimating the aircraft height before initiating the flare, 26.04% of the pilots
(novice =10.65%, intermediate =7.69%, expert =7.69%) indicated the horizon
and end of runway, 18.93% (novice =9.47%, intermediate =5.92%,
'.
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expert = 3.55%) indicated shape of runway and runway markings, 9.47%
(novice =4.14%, intermediate =2.37%, expert =2.96%) indicated familiar
objects, 4.14% (novice =2.96%, intermediate =1.18%) indicated angle with
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Figure 7, Monocular Cues Employed During the Landing Flare
runway, 1.18% (novice =0.59%, intermediate =0.59%) indicated motion
parallax, .059% of the expert pilots indicated relative size, and 0.59% of experts
indicated texture gradient. As depicted in Figure 8, 28.99 % (novice = 13.02%,
intermediate =10.06%, expert =5.92%) were not able to identify what it is in the
visual environment that assists in vertical distance estimation during the flare.
It is interesting to note that 110.06% (novice =5.92%, intermediate =
1.18%, expert = 2.96%) indicated the use of kinesthetic information such as
--
ground effect or "sinking rate" as a contributing factor to successful landing
flares.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
This study first separated flare accident frequencies from the approach
and landing accident frequencies. The task of sorting out flare accidents from
NTSB accident reports was unique to this study and revealed disturbing results.
As indicated, there were approximately eight flare accidents per month across
the years 1995, 1996, and 1997.
It is important to note that flare related incidents are most likely under
reported to the NTSB and the Federal Aviation administration (FAA). Private
aircraft owners may underestimate flare incidents or simply avoid the
embarrassment of reporting a flare incident. Moreover, it was found that many
accident narratives included the symptoms of improper flares, but were not
diagnosed as a flare accident. It is possible that the ability to diagnose flare
related incidents varies from one investigator to another.
Conclusions yielded from NTSB accident report analyses were supported
by pilot perceptions. Overall, pilots believed the flare maneuver to be more
difficult than steep turns, takeoff roll, holding altitude, climbing, descending,
57
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taxiing, coordinated turns, forward slips, or landing roll, regardless of their
experience. Moreover, this study supported the relationship among proper flares
and experience. Results suggested that novice pilots found the flare maneuver to
be more difficult than intermediate or expert pilots.
It is possible that pilots intuitively recognize the flare as a hurdle to perfect
landings but fail to acknowledge the significance of the maneuver. When asked
to estimate flare accident rates, pilots grossly overestimated the number of flare
accidents per year. Pilot overestimation of flare accident rates may be an implicit
admission to the difficulty of the flare maneuver. However, explicit questions
revealed a different trend. Overall, pilots underestimated the proportion of flare
accidents within total approach and landing accidents, were confident in their
ability to estimate height during the flare, and only provided lukewarm support for
improved flare-training methods.
In order to understand pilot perceptions, one must explore how pilots
perceive depth during the flare. Overall, all pilots recognized vision as the most
important tool for depth perception during the leveloff. However, most pilots failed
to explain how vision is used during the flare. Thus, it is possible that awareness
is not critical to the learning of appropriate visual cues. In fact, whereas the
acquisition of flare depth perception cues is a product of experience or learning,
approximately one half of the sampled pilots attributed their successful flares to
natural or innate abiliti~es.
One of the most significant findings was the importance of experience and
proper training. All pilots, regardless of experience, attested to the importance of
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experience and instruction. Analysis of qualitative data suggested that pilots
particularly stressed the importance of repeated practice coupled with proper
instruction.
Despite findings of implicit support to the difficulty of the flare maneuver,
this study failed to find omnibus effects of experience on pilot perceptions.
Similarities among novice, intermedi!ate, and expert perceptions were perplexing.
The explanation may be embedded within the design. For the purpose of this
study, novices were defined as student pilots, intermediate as instrument pilots,
and experts as flight instructors (CFls). Naturally, CFI and student interaction is
frequent and intensive. It is possible that flight instructors may have answered
the various items from the perspective of their students, not their own.
Alternatively, student pilots may have emphasized CFls concerns rather than
their own.
It is plausible that the intense interaction between pilots typical to Part 141
flight schools may have contributed to regression of pilot perceptions toward the
mean. On the other hand, Part 61 flight schools, usually allow pilots to advance
at their own pace, are less intensive, and do not mandate ground school, It is
possible that Part 61 pilots would be less influenced by perceptions other than
their own.
Finally, it is important to address a few limitations that are inherent to all
qualitative studies. Low response rates and unavailability of certain groups
reduce statistical power and jeopardize statistical assumptions. In this study,
failure to obtain the desired number of expert pilots stemmed from the
- - ----- ------------------
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proportionally low number of experts relative to students, low response rates, and
lack of accessibility of expert pilots. In addition to low response rates and
participant unavailability, survey studies are plagued with validity concerns. For
example, participants may interpret identical questions in different ways, and be
influenced by demand characteristics or role demands (McBurney, 1994).
In this study, findings suggested that while pilots overestimated flare
accident frequencies, they underestimated the proportion of flare accidents within
total landing accident frequencies. It is plausible that participants interpreted the
later to mean, the likelihood of personally being involved in a flare accident
during the landing phase of operations. As a consequence, pilots answered the
two questions differently. Furthermore, participants may have responded
according to what they believed was expected from them. For example. the role
of pilots as "top guns" may have influenced pilot responses. It is possible that
pilots are not eager to admit difficulties or lack of confidence. As indicated earlier,
difficulty with the flare maneuver was implicitly acknowledged, but explicitly
concealed in pilot responses.
Conclusions
The objectives of this study were threefold. The primary goal was to
determine whether the flare is a significant maneuver within the approach and
landing phase of operations. The secondary objective was to determine probable
causes for improper flares. Finally, the tertiary goal was to assess the
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effectiveness and identify weaknesses in current flare training methods.
The National Traffic Safety Board (NTSB) and leading insurance
companies, such as the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association Insurance
Agency (AOPIA) (B. Jennings, personal communication, October 4,2000), do not
distinguish between flare accidents and approach and landing accidents. As a
consequence, the significance of flare accidents has been overlooked in the
is.'H 1.
literature. This study revealed relatively high flare accident rates. In fact, i@i7f"4%
of all landing accidents in 1995, 1996, and 1997 were flare related accidents.
The financial implications of improper flares are clear. Increased payloads
at touchdown may lead to failure of the landing gear tires and struts and to long-
term structural damage. However, the psychological implications are subtler.
Perfect landings are frequently used to evaluate pilot performance and contribute
to positive self-esteem and self-efficacy. Yet, it is specifically the landing phase of
operations that most pilots struggle with. This study recognized the landing flare
as a significant hurdle in the quest for perfect landings within the approach and
landing phase of operation. Possible implications are reduced self-esteem and
self-efficacy, increase time-to-solo, and increased drop-off rates at initial General
Aviation (GA) training phases, as well as later recreational phases.
As mentioned, vision is the most important tool pilots have during the flare.
Appropriate scanning allows the pilot to initiate the flare at an appropriate
altitude. However, as evident from pilot answers, the ability may be acquired
without conscious awareness through repeated experience in the airport
environment. It was found that the horizon and end of runway, shape of runway
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or runway markings, and familiar objects were the most frequent visual cues that
pilots used to estimate their height during the flare. Nevertheless. most pilots
were not able to indicate any type of visual cues.
It is possible that the factors that contribute to proper flares are also
probable causes for improper flares. The proper f1are-experience paradox that
was mentioned earlier is obvious. Proper flares depend on monocular cues. and
monocular depend on experience. Despite commitment, ambition, and
enthusiasm, the one thing that student and many GA pilots lack is experience.
Without experience, how are student pilots expected to perform proper flares?
Perhaps appropriate monocular cues should be taught in ground schools?
However, it is not clear which depth perception cues are most important during
the flare. In fact, pilots use different cues or combinations of monocular cues.
Furthermore, it may prove especially difficult to teach appropriate monocular
cues. It appears that awareness is not critical to the learning of monocular cues,
and most pilots cannot explain what cues they use during the flare. If that is the
case, how are flight instructors expected to teach what they themselves do not
know?
Finally, current flare training methods do not address the problem of
experience and proper instruction. In fact, there is no agreement on an effective
way to use vision during the flare, and CFI instruction is inconsistent. For
example, overall, University of Oklahoma pilots used the horizon or end of
runway, whereas Oklahoma State University pilots used the shape of runway or
runway markings.
-
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It is possible that "the reason no student knows where the ground
begins is because the method we use to teach landing to students is wrong and
does not work" (Penglis, 1994, p. 91).
Recommendations
Past studies have attempted to identify and analyze the various monocular
cues that enhance depth perception during the flare (for example, Mulder,
Pleijsant, vand der Vaart, & van Wieringen, 2000). However, it has already been
established that (a) monocular cues enhance depth perception during the
landing, approach, and flare, and (b) any attempt to determine how pilots use
these cues is futile; pilots use different monocular cues or a combination of cues.
Suffice to say that with experience, visual cues are learned and proper flares
executed.
Futu re stud ies need to add ress the issues of experience and proper
instruction instead of providing further evidence to the usefulness of monocular
cues. For example, since proper flares depend on monocular cues, and
monocular cues depend on experience, methods that facilitate the association
between monocular cues and the proper flare altitude would be prudent.
Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, this study stressed flare accident frequencies, emphasized
-
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the inadequacy of current flare training methods to provide proper experience
and instruction, and addressed the need for a paradigm shift in future studies.
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APPENDIX A
PARTICIPANT STATISTICS BY SCHOOL AND
EXPERIENCE
71
72
Gender Age Total Flight Aircraft
Male Female Time C152 C172 PA-28
N 12 1 22.69 26.85 0% 0% 100%
au 12 2 22.57 180.71 0% 0% 100%
E 10 2 25.92 1025.00 0% 0% 100%
Total 34 5 23.73 410.85
N 18 2 19.85 21.88 100% 0% 0%
OSU I 18 0 21.50 185.33 16.7% 83.3% 0%
E 9 2 25.91 593.73 81.8% 18.2% 0%
Total 45 4 22.42 266.98
N 20 2 19.68 33.45 86.40% 13.60% 0%
SP 9 4 23.00 182.31 53.80% 46.20% 0%
E 11 0 25.73 716.09 54.50% 45.50% 0%
Total 40 6 22.08 310.62
Legend
OU = University of Oklahoma
OSU = Oklahoma State University
SP = Spartan Aeronautical
N = Novice
I = Intermediate
E = Expert
APPENDIX B
PILOT PERCEPTION QUESTIONNAIRE
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NOTICE: ORIGINAL FONT SIZE WAS REDUCED TO CONFORM TO THESIS
MARGIN REQUIREMENTS
In order to ensure anonymity, please do not write your name on this form. However, for the
purpose of demographic information please answer the following items,
-
A. Gender: ___ male female
---
B. Age: years old.
c. Total flight time: hours.
D. Approximate flight hours within 90 days: _
E. Type of aircraft most frequently flown: _
~ Please, do not turn this page until you ,have completed it.
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[Student, Instrument, CFI] Pilot,
The following are standard flight maneuvers. To the right of each maneuver you will find a scale
that indicates level of difficulty (1 =extremely easy - 7=extremely difficult). Based on your
experience as [a(n) Student, Instrument, CFI] pilot, please indicate how easy or difficult you
believe each maneuver is to execute properly under optimal conditions (i.e., VFR weather, no
wind. 10 miles visibility etc.).
Please Circle your choices to the following phases of operations.
,- Extremely Extremely
Easy Difficult
o Steep Turns 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6 Takeoff Roll 2 3 4 5 6 7
@ Holding Altitude 2 3 4 5 6 7
o Climbing 2 3 4 5 6 7
o Descending 2 3 4 5 6 7
@ Landing Flare 2 3 4 5 6 7
o Taxiing 2 3 4 5 6 7
(1) Coordinated Turns 2 3 4 5 6 7
o Forward Slip 2 3 4 5 6 7
lID Landing Roll 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
~ Please, do not turn this page until you have completed it.
Turn page r:r
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The following questions will be specific to the landing flare phase of operations. Answer each
question based on your perceptions as (a(n) Student, Instrument, CFI] pilot.
00 Assume that there are a total of 487 landing accidents in the U.S across all aircraft classes
(i.e., single, multi, jet, glider, gyroplane, helicopter) in a given year. Please estimate the total
number of flare accidents per year.
Answer (insert number): __",---,,,....-...,.,..-_f1are accidents per year.
06 How confident are you in your estimate to the above question (question 11)? Please
Circle your answer (1 = low confidence, 7=high confidence).
-
1 2 3
Low Confidence
4 5 6 7
High Confidence
, ..
O€) Please indicate the likelihood of being involved in a flare accident during the landing
phase of operations? Please circle your answer?
0-5% 6-10% 11-15% 16-20% 21-25% 26-30% 31·35% 36~40% 41-45%
Turn page <r
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As you know, the flare is initiated by leveling the aircraft 10 to 20 ft from the ground. Once
initiated, back elevator pressure is gradually increased until touchdown.
The following questions refer to the leveloff phase, or the transition from descent attitude to
leveloff attitude 10 to 20 ft from the ground.
00 Imagine that you are transitioning from descent to level attitude. How confident are you
that your plane is 10-20 ft from the ground (1 =Iow confidence, 7=hjgh confidence)?
6 7
High Confidence
54311 2
Low Confidence
,J l' ¢t;))/'. • ow
00 Bring to mind your first solo attempts to estimate the aircraft height before initiating the
flare? Did the following options assist you in your task (1 =not at all, 7=to great extent)?
Not at AU
(a) CFI instructions
(b) Instrument readings
(c) Practice
(d) Pilot Manual
(e) Ground school training
(f) Other: _
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
To Great Extent
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
Turn page rr
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00 Pilots are required to flare the aircraft 10 - 20 feet from the ground. How would you rate
the task of jUdging your aircraft height above the ground when initiating the flare (1 =very
easy, 7=very difficult)? Please circle your answer.
1
Very Easy
2 3 6 7
Very Difficult
0& Imagine that you are on approach for landing. How do you know when to start the flare,
that is, how do you know when you are about 10 - 20 ft above the ground? Please circle
one answer.
(a) Instrument readings
(b) Gut reaction
(c) I don't
(d) Sense of sight
(e) Sense of balance
(f) Other: :--_....".,..._~"":':"":':':::-:-:--_:__:__-~----..,..._-
09 Do you think there is a need for improved flare training methods? Please circle your choice
(1=definitely yes, 7=definilely no)?
1
Definitely Yes
2 3 4 5 6 7
Definitely No
Turn page qo
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00 To what do you attribute your successful landing flares today? Please rate the following
options (1 =not at all. 7=to great extent)?
Not at All To Great Extent
(a) Pattern practice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(b) Natural ability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(c) Sheer luck 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(d) Aviation books 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(e) My instructor 2 3 4 5 6 7
(f) Other: 2 3 4 5 6 7
60 Is there a need to learn how to judge height above the ground, or are we born with the
ability to estimate height during the flare, i.e., the ability is innate or natural. Please circle
your choice (1 =ability is learned, 7=ability is innate)?
1 2
Ability is Learned
3 4 5 6 7
Ability is Innate
Turn page ".
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The following three questions require you to write a concise answer. Please think carefully before
you answer. Your answer may contribute to general aviation safety.
60 Please elaborate on how you know when to start the flare (i.e., instrument readings;
gut reaction; I don't; sense of sight; sense of balance; or other).
For example, if your answer was "I don't", you may write "when it feels right to flare I
increase back elevator pressure, close my eyes and hope for the best", Try to be as
specific as possible.
(Please print) _
_______________________ (use other side if needed)
Turn page <Jr
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66 Please elaborate to what you attribute your successful landing flares today (i.e., pattern
practice; natural ability; shear luck; aviation books; my instructor; or other). For example,
if your answer was "aviation books", you may write, "since I am a book worm, I learned all
that I need from books. The books that I used were the private pilot course manuals by
King and Gleim." Try to be as specific as possible.
(Please print) _
(use other side if needed)
Turn page rr
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f}€) Some authors claim that vision is an important sense for determining height above the
ground. Please indicate what type of visual information would assist you in determining
that you are 10 - 20 ft above the ground (i.e., where would you look, what would you look
for).
(Please print) _
(use other side if needed)
---------------------
You have completed the questionnaire. Please accept our sincere gratitude and wishes for
safe flying.
APPENDIX C
INCLUSIVE AIRCRAFT FLARE ACCIDENT
BY YEAR AND TYPE
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Aircraft type
1995
Year
1996 1997 Total
84
Single engine
Aeronca 11-AC 0 1 0 1
Aviat A-1 1 0 0 1
Ayres S2R 1 0 1 2
Barrigar RV-6 (hb) 0 0 1 1
Beech 23 0 2 1 3
Beech 33 0 0 2 2
Beech 35 1 1 0 2
Bellanca 7KCAB 0 1 0 1
Boeing B75 0 1 0 1
Brown Air Shark III (hb) 0 0 1 1
Cessna 140 0 3 0 3
Cessna 150 5 6 4 15
Cessna 152 8 21 8 37
Cessna 170 1 0 1 2
Cessna 172 13 29 16 58
Cessna 175 0 0 1 1
Cessna 177 2 2 2 6
Cessna 180 0 0 1 1
Aircraft type
~--- -----------...,..
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Year
1995 1996 1997 Total
Cessna 182 3 4 7 14
Cessna 185 2 0 1 3
Cessna 206 2 0 2 4
Cessna 210 1 2 1 4
Champ~n7ECA/GCBC 2 0 0 2
Curtis-Wright P-40 0 0 1 1
Glasair 3SH-3R (exp) 0 1 0 1
Grumman G-164 1 0 1 2
Knapp Packard (exp) 1 0 0 1
Kolb Mark III (exp) 0 1 0 1
LAKE LA-4-200 1 1 0 2
Lancair 320 1 0 0 1
Maule MT-7-235 0 1 0 1
Mooney M20 2 2 2 6
Piper J3C 0 2 1 3
Piper PA-18 1 0 0 1
Piper PA-24 0 1 0 1
Piper PA-25 0 0 1 1
Piper PA-28 4 7 5 16
Aircraft type
~-----------------~---
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Year
1995 1996 1997 Total
Piper PA-32 0 1 2 3
Piper PA-34 2 0 2 4
Piper PA-38 0 2 3 5
Pitts S-1 S 2 0 1 3
Rans s-12 xl (exp) 0 0 1 1
Rominger EYAS (exp) 0 1 0 1
Russell KR-2 (exp) 1 0 0 1
Siai-Marchetti F206C 0 1 0 1
Steinke Early Bird 1 0 0 1
Travel Air 1 0 0 1
Waco 0 2 0 2
Single total 60 96 69 225
Multi engine
Beech 18 1 0 0 1
Beech 19 1 1 1 3
Beech 55 1 1 0 2
Beech 95 0 1 0 1
Beech 100 0 0 1 1
Beech 1900 0 1 0 1
Aircraft type
--_._-------------
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Year
1995 1996 1997 Total
Cessna 310 1 0 0 1
Cessna 337 2 0 0 2
Fairchild Merlin IliA 1 0 0 1
Lockheed L-382 1 a a 1
Piper PA-30 0 1 0 1
Piper PA-44 a 1 0 1
Multi total 8 6 2 16
Jet engine
Boeing 747 0 a 1 1
Boeing 767 a 0 1 1
Cessna 650 Citation III a a 1 1
Mikoyan Gurevich MIG 15UTI a a 1 1
Jet total a 0 4 4
Gyroplane
Knoll-Bensen B-80 1 0 a 1
Gyroplane total 1 0 a 1
Glider
Aeromot AMT-200 (p) a 0 1 1
Grab 103 0 0 1 1
Ai rcraft type
1995
Year
1996 1997 Total
88
Vickers-Slingsby T65A 0 0 1 1
Glider total 0 0 3 3
Helicopter
Bell 47 2 2 0 4
Bell 206 1 1 0 2
Brantly B-2 0 1 0 1
Fairchild Hiller FH-1100 0 0 1 1
Hiller UH-12A 1 0 0 1
Hughes 269 0 2 1 3
Hughes 369 1 1 0 2
Robinson R-22 4 0 1 5
Helicopter total 9 7 3 19
Total 78 109 81 268
1- -- ---------
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